News - 11-11-05
John Earl Haynes Talks in Raleigh
The American Communist Party as an Auxiliary to Espionage: From Asset to Liability
John Earl Haynes
Espionage not the Chief Task
From the 1920s to the mid-1940s the American Communist party functioned as an auxiliary to Soviet espionage. Espionage, however, was not the central task of the Communist Party, USA, or CPUSA as it has been entitled since the late 1920s. The CPUSA’s chief task was political. It sought to bring about the transformation of the United States from an open market capitalist democracy to a Marxist-Leninist socialist state modeled on the Soviet Union.
At its origins in 1919 and year or two thereafter and occasionally later it thought this transformation would be brought about directly by violent proletarian revolution. Chiefly, however, American Communists recognized the absence of a revolutionary situation and sought power though the democratic political process and the trade union movement in hopes of either bringing about a situation in which a revolutionary seizure of power was possible. Most often, this latter task expressed itself in using its political and organizational power to promote the interests of the Soviet Union with the expectation that Soviet power would eventually grow to the point that the USSR could force the United States into a situation where the CPUSA’s seizure of power would be possible. The CPUSA’s chief task, then, was politics or, if you wish, subversion, but not espionage. And the history of the American Communist movement is chiefly a history of the party’s work in politics and in the trade union movement.
Espionage, while not the CPUSA’s chief task, was nonetheless an important task of the movement until the late 1940s. And it was a task that grew naturally out of the CPUSA’s expectation that the growth of Soviet power would eventually bring about a situation where its seizure of power would move from the realm of the theoretical to the possible.
CPUSA Responded
In the history of the American Communist Party and espionage one can find example of CPUSA leaders initiating an espionage operation. But for the most part, the party’s role was that of an auxiliary that responded to, assisted, and facilitated initiatives taken by a Soviet intelligence agency. The CPUSA assisted not only the two major Soviet agencies, the KGB and Soviet military intelligence, GRU, but even the very small Soviet naval espionage agency, the Naval GRU. It does not appear that the CPUSA had a closer relationship with one of the agencies, but responded as best to could to all three.
Why did the Soviets use the CPUSA?
The chief reason the Soviets used the CPUSA is an obvious one: it enabled them to accomplish a great deal more than they could otherwise have done. Prior to the Cold War the USSR put more resources into foreign intelligence than did any other nation, but its espionage ambitions still exceeded its resources, and the assistance of foreign Communist parties allowed Soviet agencies to make up for a large part of their shortfall. Indeed, the assistance of the American Communist party magnified the productivity of those professional intelligence officers sent to the United States. It is not possible to quantify with any precision how much assistance the CPUSA provided, but my own estimate is that American Communist party assistance certainly double, probably tippled, and possibly quadrupled the productivity of Soviet espionage efforts.
What did the CPUSA do for the Soviets?
The CPUSA freed professional Soviet officers from a great deal of the tedious and time-consuming tasks of spying. American Communists also compensated for the deficiencies of some Soviet professionals, particularly problems with inadequate English and a lack of understanding of American culture and society.
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